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Between	 enabling	 and	 provider	 approach:	Key	 shifts	 in	 the	 national	 housing	
policy	in	India	and	Brazil	
	
1.	 Introduction	
	
With	 the	 world	 becoming	 increasingly	 urban,	 the	 number	 of	 slums	 and	 squatter	
settlements	 has	 reached	 new	 levels.	 Alarming	 statistics	 on	 the	 urbanisation	 and	
housing	poverty	has	made	 the	metaphor	 “planet	of	 slums”	a	 global	 reality.	Between	
2000	 and	 2014,	 cities	 across	 the	world	 saw	 14%	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 urban	
residents	 living	 in	 slums	 (UN,	 2014).	 Government	 response	 to	 the	 housing	 crisis	 in	
previous	decades	is	characterised	by	various	approaches	constituting	public	housing	
(both	ownership	and	rental),	 sites‐and‐services,	 slum	upgrading,	and	other	self‐help	
models	yielding	rather	limited	levels	of	success.	Since	the	early	1990s,	enabling	shelter	
strategy	was	advocated	as	 the	most	promising	way	of	addressing	housing	 challenge	
posed	by	rapid	urbanisation	in	global	South.	Enabling	strategy,	first	articulated	in	the	
General	 Assembly	 of	 United	 Nations	 in	 1988	 and	was	 subsequently	 adopted	 in	 the	
Global	Shelter	Strategies	in	2000	and	reiterated	in	several	UN	and	World	Bank	reports	
(UN‐Habitat,	1988,	2001,	2003,	2006,	2016;	World	Bank,	1993).	The	enabling	strategy	
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seeks	to	create	enabling	housing	regimes,	that	allow	markets	to	produce	housing	for	all,	
including	 low‐income	 people	 and	 the	 state	 taking	 the	 back	 seat	 to	 managing	 the	
institutional,	legislative	and	regulatory	environment.	In	this	sense,	enabling	is	enabling	
markets	 to	work	 and	 protecting	 them	 from	market	 failure	 (Angel,	 2000,	 p.15).	 The	
World	 Bank	 mainstreamed	 its	 application	 with	 ‘Enabling	 Housing	 to	Work’	 (1993)	
advocating	 that	 housing	 sector	 should	 be	 seen	 and	managed	 as	 part	 of	 the	 overall	
economy.	 The	 underlined	 philosophy	 was	 that	 government	 should	 withdraw	 from	
direct	production	of	housing	or	give	out	subsidies	of	any	form	for	housing.	The	strategy	
was	also	reinforced	by	Agenda	21	and	Millennium	Development	Goals	(MDGs)	which	
were	subsumed	into	2030	Agenda	for	Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs)	lending	
more	credence	to	an	inclusive	approach	to	sustainability.	Many	governments	felt	the	
obligation	 to	 sign	 up	 to	 the	 key	 principles	 of	 enabling	 strategy	 advocated	 by	 these	
powerful	international	agencies.	Countries	such	as	Brazil	and	India	introduced	a	raft	of	
reforms	 to	entice	 the	private	 sector	 to	 supply	housing	 for	 all	 (including	 low‐income	
population)	 in	 tandem	 with	 a	 gradual	 withdrawal	 from	 public	 housing.	 	 Housing	
challenges,	however,	persisted	as	a	 large	number	of	people	continue	to	live	in	slums	
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and	 favelas1.	We	 can	 expect	 the	 situation	 to	 worsen	 with	 the	 impoverished	 urban	
dwellers	continuing	to	face	multiple,	interlocking	disadvantages	that	relate	to	all	three	
‐	social,	economic	and	environmental	–	dimensions	of	their	lives.		
	
Scholarship	over	the	years	has	assessed	the	performance	and	limitations	of	enabling	
housing	framework	which	has	progressed	through	a	multitude	of	localised	mutations	
and	 adaptations	 within	 the	 respective	 political	 structures	 of	 the	 countries.	 In	 both	
Brazil	and	India,	the	three	decades	of	policy	experiments	have	generated	an	inventory	
of	 ‘empirical	examples’	 through	a	series	of	 flagship	national	housing	programmes	of	
varying	 magnitude,	 scale	 and	 subsidy	 quotient.	 There	 appear	 to	 be	 compelling	
paradoxes	that	make	it	opportune	to	review	their	housing	programmes	to	explore	first,	
how	 far	 enabling	 strategies	 have	 been	 followed	 and	 second,	 to	 understand	 the	
conceptual	similarities	in	the	empirical	practices,	processes	and	outcomes.	While	both	
Brazil	 and	 India	provide	 regional	 leadership	and	 influence	on	global	housing	policy,	
ultimately	 they	 leave	 their	 housing	 challenges	unmet.	The	paper	does	not	 intend	 to	
																																																								
1 After three decades of implementation of enabling strategies, the number of Brazilians living in poor housing conditions 
has increased from 6.5 million in 2000 to 11.4 million in 2010 whereas in India, number of people living in substandard 
housing (still over one-third of the country’s population) has not gone down. 
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evaluate	 these	programmes	or	 their	outcomes	but	 to	capture	how	different	national	
housing	programmes	are	moving	within	the	broad	policy	architecture.	Where	do	we	
stand	between	the	provider	or	enabling	approach?	Is	there	one	distinctive	model?	Both	
countries	have	adopted	a	variety	of	enabling	strategies	along	with	closely	intertwined	
strategies	of	crisis	management	and	show	a	clear	predisposition	towards	the	provider	
approach	 through	state‐administered,	 large‐scale	housing	programmes.	Next	section	
presents	 an	 overview	 of	 enabling	 housing	 paradigm	 followed	 by	 a	 review	 of	 the	
government	housing	programmes	 in	Brazil	 and	 India	 in	 Section	3.	 Some	 conceptual	
contradictions	are	discussed	in	the	concluding	sections	that	obscure	the	international	
housing	policy	debate	today.	The	material	presented	here	is	derived	from	an	extensive	
review	of	the	literature	and	official	statistics	focused	on	plans	and	programmes	in	Brazil	
and	India	as	well	as	contextualising	this	to	the	advice	being	dispensed	by	international	
agencies.		
2.	 Enabling	housing	paradigm:	Coming	of	an	age?	
	
For	a	period	of	nearly	three	decades,	World	Bank	and	UN‐Habitat	advocated	enabling	
housing	 paradigm	 in	 response	 to	 the	 endemic	 housing	 shortage	 in	 several	 parts	 of	
global	 South	 (Sengupta,	 2006;	 Yap,	 2015).	 Their	 advice	 was	 rooted	 in	 the	 twin	
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framework	of	rescaling	the	state	and	enabling	the	market.	The	thrust	of	this	framework	
was	to	encourage	the	private	sector	in	delivering	housing	for	all	groups	leaving	the	state	
to		a	supporting	role	with	timely	and	appropriate	regulatory	reforms.	Enabling	strategy	
worked	 well	 in	 many	 countries	 particularly	 in	 gaining	 rapid	 economic	 growth	 and	
poverty	 reduction,	but	 	 concomitantly	 saw	rising	 	 income	 inequality	 in	 terms	of	per	
capita	income	or	expenditure	(Yap,	2015)	widening	the	gap	in	housing	conditions	of	the	
rich	and	the	poor	making	it	somewhat	inconsistent	with	the	general	thrust	of	welfarism	
of	the	previous	era.		The	process	and	the	outcome	of	enabling	approach	are	however	
complex.	 Three	 strands	 of	 scholarly	 criticism	are	 seen	 levelled	 against	 it.	 	 First,	 the	
historical	progress	has	been	characterised	by	 lower	overall	production	(Bhan,	2009,	
Islam,	1996;	Sengupta,	2006,	Tipple	and	Korboe,	1998;	Yap,	2015)	insufficient	to	filter	
through	 to	 the	 lower‐income	 segments	 of	 the	 society	 (Ahmed,	 1998;	 Ogu	 and	
Ogbuozobe,	 2001;	 Rondinelli,	 1990;	 Tipple,	 1994)	 or	 the	 informal	 sector	 (Durand‐
Lasserve,	 1987;	 Okpala,	 1994).	 Second,	 mortgage	 finance	 mechanism	 has	 shown	
inherent	bias	against	 the	urban	poor	 (Choguill,	1997;	Smets,	1997;	 Jones	and	Ward,	
1995;	Datta	and	Jones,	1999;	Rahman,	2009;	Rolnik,	2013)		precluding	those	working	
in	cash	economy	and	informal	sector.	Third,	and	significantly,	rising	cost	of	land	and	
housing	emerged	as	the	byproduct	of	both	ideological	(greater	reliance	on	the	profit‐
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seeking	market,	biased	finance	disbursement)	and	tectonic	(frictions	among	different	
groups)	 standpoints.	 As	 an	 object	 of	 academic	 enquiry,	 enabling	 strategy	 is	
predominantly	 framed	as	an	 issue	of	 coordination	and	governance	 in	 the	 context	of	
dramatic	 unevenness	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 resources	 in	 different	 geographies	 and	
institutional	structures	of	urban	governance.	These	scholarships,	however,	converge	at	
and	highlight	the	inherent	inefficiency	of	the	enabling	mechanism	to	see	beyond	the	top	
percentile	 of	 the	 population	 (Wakely,	 2014).	 The	 private	 sector	 had	 channelled	 its	
attention	to	delivering	middle	and	higher‐end	housing	seeking	to	shore	up	their	own	
legitimacy	gradually	gaining	absolute	control	over	the	housing	market	abetted	by	the	
local	and	national	elites.	In	the	process,	the	enabling	framework	actually	exacerbated	
many	 of	 the	 housing	 problems	 it	 ostensibly	 aspired	 to	 resolve	 such	 as	 economic	
stagnation,	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 housing	 shortage,	 unrealistic	 affordability	
thresholds	and	lack	of	access	to	formal	credit	etc.	The	severity	of	the	damage	was	such	
that	 the	 1990s	 decade	 became	 a	 period	 during	which	 housing	 policy	 ‘lost	 its	 voice’		
(Angel,	2000,	p.3).	
A	mid‐term	review	of	the	two	decades	of	implementation	of	enabling	strategies	by	UN‐
Habitat	(UN‐Habitat,	2006)	emphasised	the	global	trends	of	lower	housing	production,	
poor	targeting	and	lack	of	institutional	infrastructure.	The	review	did	not	prompt	any	
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slowdown	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 enabling	 strategy	 due	 to	 its	 contextual	
embeddedness	 within	 the	 popular	 neoliberalist	 tradition	 and	 associated	 economic	
arguments	 (that	 market	 was	 inherently	 more	 efficient	 and	 effective	 than	 the	
government).	A	great	deal	of	persuasive	writing	has	however	emerged	that	makes	a	
case	 for	 the	 return	 of	 stronger	 state	 intervention	 in	 housing	 (Angel,	 2000;	Mukhija,	
2001,	2003,	Cao	and	Keivani,	2015;	Yap,	2015).	Mukhija	(2001),	citing	examples	of	slum	
redevelopment	in	Mumbai	highlighted	the	paradoxical	nature	of	market	mechanism	in	
the	Indian	context.	In	and	early	but	an	apt	reminder	of	the	duality	of	housing	delivery	
in	 India,	 he	 argues	 that	 the	 Indian	 government	 may	 need	 to	 embrace	 policy	
contradictions	 to	 ensure	 citizens’	 rights	 to	 housing	 and	 to	 curb	 apparent	 developer	
disinterest	to	serve	the	poor	within	the	enabled	market	environment.	A	decade	later,	
Cao	and	Keivani	(2014)		argue	for	government	intervention	to	enhance	social	housing	
provision	 and	 to	 tighten	 market	 regulation	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 address	 both	 market	 and	
government	failure2.	Increasingly,	it	is	recognised	that	the	market‐oriented	economic	
reforms	have	obfuscated	the	real	problems	faced	by	the	urban	poor	as	they	failed	to	
address	the	core	principles	of	enablement	‐	transparency	and	participation	in	accessing	
																																																								
2 This view builds on the emergent  trend  that began with Chinese government’s announcement of one of the largest 
social housing construction programmes in the world with an initial target of around 36 million units by 2015 (Wang and 
Shao, 2010) after two decades of intensive housing privatisation, in 2010. 
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housing	and	basic	services.	 In	response,	 the	past	decade	has	seen	a	sudden	surge	of	
state‐administered	 	 large‐scale	 housing	 programmes	 in	 many	 developing	 countries	
involving	multi‐billion	dollar	 investments	disbursing	sophisticated	subsidy	packages	
(Sengupta	and	Tipple,	2007;	Wang	and	Shao,	2010;	UN‐Habitat,	2013).	
		
To	say	that	the	enabling	approach	to	housing	is	no	longer	desirable	or	viable	may	be	an	
overstatement.	 However,	 the	 UN‐Habitat	 in	 its	 one	 of	 the	most	 sincere	 admissions	
provides	the	strongest	indication	yet	of	the	apparent	failure	of	the	enabling	strategy:	
…in	reality,	one	and	the	same	bias	has	been	at	work	across	the	world:	middle‐class	formal	
home‐ownership	has	been	systematically	“enabled”,	but	ever‐growing	numbers	of	poor	
citizens	 have	 been	 durably	 “disabled”	 from	 access	 to	 adequate	 housing,	 remaining	
confined	in	single‐room	or	informal	housing,	not	to	mention	sheer	homelessness	(World	
Cities	Report,	UN	Habitat,	2016).	
	
Interestingly,	 these	 views	 emanating	 from	 the	 organisation	 that	 has	 been	 at	 the	
forefront	of	promoting	enabling	approach	are	significant.	In	this	context,	the	study	of	
Brazilian	and	Indian	housing	context	not	only	provides	useful	insights	but	also	helps	to	
reignite	the	debate	on	the	dichotomy	of	enabling	vs.	provider	approach.	At	the	present	
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time,	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	housing	policies	in	global	South	really	represent	a	
wholesome	 adoption	 of	 ‘enabling	 framework’	 or	 they	 are	 an	 embodiment	 of	 both	
enabling	and	provider	approaches	blurring	the	boundaries	of	privatization	and	public	
investment,	deregulation	and	new	regulations	where	housing	policies	are	continuously	
evolving.		
	
3	 Government	Intervention	in	Brazil	and	India		
Government	intervention	in	housing	in	Brazil	and	India	reveal	some	interesting	trends	
in	response	to	the	massive	housing	crisis	observed	in	both	countries.		
3.1	 Brazil:	State‐local	policies	and	paradigm		
	
The	development	 trajectory	 in	Brazil	 in	 the	1980	and	1990s	has	been	 interspersed	by	debt	
crisis	 and	 the	 subsequent	 cumbersome	 structural	 adjustment	 programmes	 amidst	 rapid	
urbanization	 leading	 to	 drastic	 processes	 of	 socio‐economic	 and	 territorial	
reorganizations.	Such	processes	generated	a	growing	housing	deficit	and	a	sharp	rise	
in	favelas.	However,	favelas	in	Brazil	have	a	long	history	of	existence,	expansion,	and	
unbridled	growth	amidst	variegated	policy	interventions.	Early	interventions	(up	until	
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the	 1990s),	 especially	 in	 cities	 such	 as	 Rio	 and	 São	 Paulo3	were	marked	 by	 highly	
centralised	clearance	policy,	relocating	squatters	to	the	housing	centres	at	the	outskirts	
of	 the	 city.	The	National	Housing	Bank	 (BNH)	 set	 up	by	 the	military	 government	 in	
1964,	and	later	renamed	as	Sistema	Financerio	da	Habitacao	or	SFH	in	1966)	showed	a	
wave	of	highly	centralised	social	housing	programmes	called	 ‘reformist	options’	that	
had	produced	roughly	five	million	new	housing	units	in	a	span	of	20	years.	SFH	was	the	
centralised	 system	 of	 housing	 finance	 which	 financed	 developers,	 public	 housing	
companies	(Companhias	Habitacionais	or	COHABS)	and	Housing	Cooperatives	(Instituto	
de	Orientacao	as	Cooperativas	Habitacionais	of	INOCOOPs)	throughout	the	region.	BNH	
had	 a	 diverse	 clientele	 wider	 geographic	 reach.	 Programmes	 such	 as	 PRÓ‐LUZ,	
PROFAVELA,	and	PROMORAR	focused	on	urban	infrastructure,	construction	of	housing	
units	through	direct	government	subsidy.		
	
With	 the	 abolition	 of	 the	 BNH4 	in	 1986,	 the	 urban	 and	 housing	 sectors	 saw	 an	
institutional	 vacuum	 at	 the	 federal	 level. Considered	 by	 Valenca	 (1998)	 as	 the	 ‘lost	
																																																								
3  See Pasternak and D’Ottaviano (2014) for details - they have divided the last 30 years of Brazilian housing into eight 
chronological periods. 
4 Established in 1964, the National Housing Bank or Banco Nacional da Habitação (BNH) operated until it was abolished 
in 1986 to be replaced by Caixa Econômica Federal. The abolition of the BNH was largely a political move, executed 
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decade’,	 the	 90s	 decade	 saw	 a	 rapid	 withdrawal	 of	 the	 national	 government	 from	
housing	in	tandem	with	transfer	of	social	housing	obligation	to	the	local	government.	
The	institutional	vacuum	in	metropolitan	areas	was	all	the	more	dramatic	considering	
the	country’s	relatively	urbanised	profile	when	large	city	regions	had	been	the	spatial	
nodes.	Conversely,	 the	 reduction	of	 federal	 programs	and	 regulations	opened	up	an	
important	window	for	policy	innovation	by	local	governments.	This	was	accompanied	
by	the	consolidation	of	democracy	with	the	first	free	state	and	municipal	elections	(in	
large	 cities)	 in	 20	 years.	 As	 a	 result,	 several	 local	 (mainly	municipal)	 governments	
started	to	produce	innovative	urban	policies	to	face	the	difficult	urban	conditions.	A	key	
element	in	this	process	was	the	slow	but	steady	expansion	of	leftwing	political	parties	
in	 local	governments	between	the	end	of	the	1980s	and	the	first	years	of	2000.	As	a	
result	plans	and	programmes	in	the	following	decade	were	dominated	by	principally	
two	aspects	of	low‐income	housing	delivery:	return	of	the	squatter	upgrading	and	back	
to	the	city	movement.	The	former	intended	to	build	self‐managed	and	community‐built	
homes	as	a	way	to	reduce	costs	and	reinforce	citizenship5.	The	latter	was	an	ideological	
																																																								
without any resistance from the people or civic society to capitalise on the public resentment of its inefficiency and 
corruption. The replacement Bank was also brought under control of the President Jose Sarney. (See Bonduki, 2014) 
5 For instance, in Osasco, COPROMO (Cooperativa Pró Moradia de Osasco/Osasco Pro-housing Cooperative) occupied 
and negotiated a large area of the city and built a housing project with 2,000 units through a community-built housing 
initiative financed by the São Paulo State Housing and Urban Development Company. 
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response	to	empty	buildings	in	the	city	centre	mainly	from	the	social	democratic	and	
left‐leaning	parties.	The	argument	was	that	even	poor	working	class	population	have		
rights	to	the	city	and	should	be	integrated	into	the		urban	culture.	Between	1991	and	
2000	the	empty	housing	stock	in	the	country	surged	 from	15.6%	to	17%	of	 its	 total	
housing	 stock	 (Table	 1).	 Empty	 buildings	 have	 continued	 to	 provide	 a	 viable	
opportunity	to	house	the	urban	poor	in	cities	such	as	Sao	Paulo	whilst	the	benevolent	
state	 acted	 as	 a	 facilitator	 in	 the	 process	 by	 altering	 legislations	 and	 constitutions,	
suggesting	 all	 properties	 have	 some	 social	 purpose.	 In	 Sao	 Paulo,	 the	 municipality	
policy	 focused	 on	 PROVER	 (Projeto	 de	 Urbanização	 de	 Favelas	 com	
Verticalização/Project	of	Squatter	Settlement	Upgrading	with	Verticalization)	known	
as	the	‘Cingapura	Project’	promoting		Apartment	style‐	vertical	units	(generally	5	to	11	
storied,	 with	 small	 units	 (42m2)	 	 constructed	 by	 private	 developers.	 Local	
municipalities	such	as	Diadema	proactively	identified	vacant	properties	and	allocated	
them	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 HIS	 (Habitação	 de	 Interesse	 Social/Social	 Interest	
Housing)	through	Special	Areas	of	Social	Interest	(AEIS)	I	and	II	in	their	master	plans.	
However,	despite	its	intellectual	and	inclusive	origin,		it	showed	the	hallmark	of	classic	
top‐down	 approach	 without	 any	 room	 for	 public	 consultation	 and	 government	
appeared	to	cherry‐pick	projects	based	on	political	indoctrination.		
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	Table	1:	Empty	homes	in	Sao	Paulo	and	Brazil	
Source:	IBGE	(1991,	2000	and	2010)	
	
The	 next	 decade	 of	 Brazilian	 housing	 continued	 to	 exhibit	 state‐centric	 pro‐people	
regeneration	(of	vacant	buildings)	alongside	settlement	upgrading	policies	led	by	city	
governments.	Social	movements	and	activism	became	the	hallmark	of	Brazil’s	housing	
landscape.	In	this	respect,	the	innovative	and	progressive	legislation	on	the	so‐called	
‘Statute	of	the	City	2001’	is	a	paradigmatic	example.	It	enabled	creation	of	Ministry	of	
Cities	and	the	National	Council	of	Cities	(Fernandes,	2007).	The	resultant	institutional	
landscape	 saw	 rise	 of	 pro‐active	 municipal	 governments	 taking	 on	 the	 mantle	 of	
housing.	 Between	 2001	 and	 2004	 once	 again	 Workers	 Party	 took	 over	 the	
administration	 of	 Sao	 Paulo,	 reigniting	 the	 discourse	 on	 revitalization	 of	 empty	
buildings	 and	 a	 participation	 of	 the	 population	 as	 a	 way	 of	 building	 citizenship.	
Programmes	such	as	PRI	 (Programa	de	Recuperação	 Integrada/Integrated	Recovery	
Programme)	defined	areas	 for	urban	 interventions	 through	the	demarcation	of	ZEIS	
(Zonas	 Especiais	 de	 Interesse	 Social/Special	 Zones	 of	 Social	 Interest).	 Part	 of	 the	
interventions	was	also	made	by	the	state	government	through	the	PAC	(Programa	de	
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Atendimento	 aos	 Cortiços/Service	 Programme	 for	 Slums),	 in	 part	 supported	 by	 the	
Federal	 government	 through	 a	 comprehensive	 Home	 Lease	 Plan	 ‐	 PAR	 (Plano	 de	
Arrendamento	Residencial).	As	a	result	of	these	initiatives,	the	number	of	takeovers	of	
vacant	 buildings	 in	 the	 inner	 city	 increased.	 The	municipal	 administration	 used	 the	
Bairro	Legal	(Cool	Neighborhood)	Programme	as	a	tool	to	implement	a	set	of	integrated	
actions	 in	 run	 down	 neighbourhoods	 occupied	 predominantly	 by	 low‐income	
population6	in	order		to	improve	access	to	public	services,	greenery	and	amenities.	It	
differs	from	the	programmes	of	the	previous	administrations	due	to	its	strong	emphasis	
on	 integrated	action	among	different	municipal	agencies	and	stakeholders	 including	
the	 non‐governmental	 organisations,	 and	 civil	 society.	 This	 bottom‐up	 approach	
enabled	low‐income	people	to	an	extent.	As	of	April	2002,	there	were	approximately	
2,866	projects	recorded	running	nation‐wide.	Upgrading	projects	geared	toward	basic	
sanitation	 but	 had	 difficulties	 in	 matching	 the	 urban	 standards	 of	 the	 formal	 city	
whereas	 resettlement	 into	 the	 city	 centre	was	 criticised	 for	 being	 fragmentary	 and	
																																																								
6	The priority areas for intervention were chosen according to a social exclusion criterion (defined as a situation of collective 
deprivation, which includes poverty, discrimination, subservience, inequity, non-accessibility, lack of public 
representation). The Bairro Legal was implemented in the first phase in Capão Redondo, Brasilândia, Lajeado, Jardim 
Ângela and Grajaú, since they had higher percentage of low-income families (15% or more). In phase two, it was extended 
to districts of Campo Limpo, Guaianazes, Iguatemi and Anhanguera. 
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inhibitory	 to	both	participation	 and	 investments	 from	 the	dwellers,	 thus	 generating	
new	debts	whilst	the	deregularised	finance	system	rarely	reached	the	poor.	Especially	
with	the	dismantling	of	the	National	Housing	Bank	(BNH)	system	in	1986	some	state	
and	municipal	housing	initiatives	gained	visibility,	but,	with	the	exception	of	Sao	Paulo	
state	–	which	set	up	a	housing	fund	based	on	a	1%	increase	in	value‐added	tax	(ICMS	–	
Imposto	sobre	Circulação	de	Mercadorias	e	Serviços)	–	most	other	schemes	were	short‐
lived	 and	 targeted	 at	 urgent	 housing	 situations	 (Valenca	 and	 Bonates,	 2010).	 The	
enabling	housing	approach	was	not	capable	of	achieving	a	rebalancing	of	housing	order.	
Instead,	it	saw	a	reassertion	of	social	class	division.		
Minha	Casa	Minha	Vida	(MCMV)	marks	a	milestone	in	the	history	of	Brazilian	housing	
by	conceptualising	the	emphatic	return	to	the	direct	provision	of	social	housing	for	the	
urban	poor.	Launched	by	President	Lula	da	Silva	in	2009,	the	programme	aimed	to	build	
millions	of	homes	for	low‐income	Brazilians	making	it	effectively	an	affordable	housing	
scheme	of	national	scale	based	on	home	ownership.	The	programme,	which	translates	
into	 “My	House	My	 Life,”	 has	 had	 investments	 totalling	 	 an	 outlay	 of	 R$340	 billion	
(US$180	billion),	delivering	more	than	4	million	homes	which	include	2.6	million	units	
delivered	 to	 low‐income	 households.	 The	 Federal	 government	 expects	 more	 than	
twenty‐five	million	 people	 to	 be	 covered	 by	 the	 programme	 by	 2019.	 In	 2016,	 the	
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initiative	 hit	 a	 roadblock,	 when	 the	 incoming	 administration	 of	 President	 Temer	
announced	 it	was	halting	 the	authorisation	of	 the	 construction	of	up	 to	11,000	new	
housing	units.	 The	 order	 had	been	 signed	by	 the	Rousseff	 administration	only	 days	
before	President	Rousseff	was	suspended	from	office.	The	president	has	since	toned	
down	his	rhetoric	and	announced	new	measures	to	kickstart	construction	of	600,000	
units	this	year.	Notwithstanding	the	apparent	vulnerability	of	MCMV	during	times	of	
both	political	 and	economic	 instability,	 it	has	shown	resilience	owing	 to	diversity	 in	
approaches	 and	 delivery.	 Amidst	 the	 hyper‐drive	 for	 home	 ownership	 through	
newbuilds	 and	 in	 an	 apparent	 fusion	 of	 ideas,	 	 the	 	 Epiringa	 and	 	 Rizkallah	 Jorge	
buildings7		in	Sao	Paulo	became	the	first	two	vacant	properties	financed	under	MCMV	
programme	 in	 2014	 and	 a	 rare	 example	 of	 rental‐subsidy.	 The	 Epiringa	 building	
(constructed	 in	1968	 for	 the	Federal	Labour	Court)	 is	 	being	converted	 into	a	social	
housing	with	120	one	bedroom	and	studio	units.	The	total	cost	of	refurbishment	would	
be	in	the	order	of	R$11m	(US$5.5m).	It	has	been	envisaged	that	beneficiaries	pay	R$15	
(US$7.5)	per	month	which	reflects	a	subsidy	of	1/10th	of	the	market	rent.	Whilst,	only	
																																																								
7	The Rizkallah Jorge building in the city centre was built in the 1940s and was intended as a luxury hotel; instead, it 
became a company head office. Sixty years on, under the private initiative option of the Residential Leasing Programme, 
it has been converted into 167 studio apartments measuring 30–40 m2, each with a bed-sitting room, kitchen, bathroom 
and utility area.  The new occupants are low-income families (See, Budds and Teixeira, 2005). 
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limited	proportion	of	the	units	under	MCMV	is	expected	to	come	from	conversions, by	
mainstreaming	 conversions	 	 MCMV	 has	 legitimised	 community	 firepower	 and	
incremental	housing	approach,	both	important	pillars	of	low‐income	housing	delivery.	
At	the	macro‐economic	level,	neither	the	ideological	underpinnings	of	the	government	
intervention	 nor	 the	 level	 of	 subsidies	 was	 questioned	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
programme	was	launched	during	the	financial	crisis	of	2008.	Justified	as	a	government	
correction	to	market	failure,	its	initial	impetus	sprang	at	least	as	directly	from	the	need	
to	 keep	 Brazil’s	 economy,	 employment,	 and	 wages	 stable	 during	 the	 recession.	
However,	the	programme	remained	quintessentially	social	housing	and	heralded	the	
proverbial	 return	 to	 the	 state‐run	 public	 housing	 of	 the	 previous	 era.	 Criticisms	
abounded	over	steering	the	subsidy	away	from	beneficiaries	to	developers	that	not	only	
manifested	in	poor	design	quality	but	also	reduced	options.	The	programme	is	almost	
entirely	(97%)	in	the	hands	of	private	promoters	(housing	construction	companies),	a	
measure	justified	to	speed	up	the	process,	avoiding	the	endless	procedures	adopted	by	
government	 institutions	(Valenca	and	Bonates,	2010).	Since	financing	 limits	are	pre‐
established,	the	values	for	calculating	profits	and	sales	revolve	around:	i)	land	value,	
which	 is	 lower	 in	peripheral	neighborhoods;	 ii)	 lower	 cost	of	design	achieved	using	
standardised	and	repetitive	designs,	in	addition	to	promoting	large	complexes,	in	order	
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to	maximise	economies	of	scale;	and	iii)	production	costs,	minimised	by	using	second‐
rate	materials.	This	 resulted	 in	 rather	small	 (of	around	32m2),	poor	quality	housing	
units	at	peripheral	locations,	devoid	of	critical	link	between	affordability,	design,	access	
and	mobility.	In	Rio	for	example,	53	percent	of	MCMV	units	delivered	before	2013	were	
located	 in	 the	 remote	 Far	 West	 Zone	 (up	 to	 four	 hours	 from	 the	 city).	 Despite	
operational	 challenges	 MCMV	 evinces	 Brazil’s	 increasing	 and	 demonstrable	
predisposition	towards	social	housing	for	those	who	cannot	afford	 ‘housing’	built	by	
private	 developers.	 The	 persistent	 housing	 shortage	 has	 influenced	 this	 trend.	
According	 to	 2010	 census,	 the	 housing	 shortage	 in	 Brazil	 	 stood	 at	 	 5.45	million.	 A	
further,	11.4	million	people	 lived	in	favelas,	 that	whilst	providing	a	housing	solution	
during	the	decades	of	rapid	urbanisation	but	condensed	leading	to	 ‘precarious	living	
conditions	 and	 violence	 during	 the	 dismantling	 of	 housing	welfare	 system’	 (Rolnik,	
2013,	p.	1061).	
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Figure	1:	Different	faces	of	Favelas	and	corticos	in	Brazil	
Source:	Authors	(2016)	
	
3.2	 India:	transition	to	cautious	statism	in	housing	
	
Government	intervention	in	housing	in	India	during	pre‐1990	period	is	characterised	
by	 the	 object	 of	 its	 emphasis	 rather	 than	 the	 degree	 of	 government	 involvement	
(Sengupta	and	Tipple,	2007).	Slum	or	bustee	improvement	projects	took	primacy	in	the	
period	immediately	following	the	independence	from	British	rule.	The	1st	Five	Year	Plan	
called	 slums	 a	 ‘national	 problem’	 suggesting	 clearance,	 but	 the	 government	 soon	
realised	that	it	neither	had	the	monetary	nor	the	institutional	capacity	to	achieve	those	
goals.	Hence,	the	2nd		Plan	recognised	upgrading	and	improvements.	The	period	is	also	
marked	with	new	legislative/institutional	building	process8	that	included		
																																																								
8 National Building Organisation was created in 1954 to facilitate research in building construction activity. Town and 
Country Planning Organisation in 1962 to facilitate spatial planning activities across the country. At the state level, 
various Housing Boards were created during the same period.  
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internationally	 maverick9	approaches	 to	 tenure	 regularization	 such	 as	 the	 Calcutta	
Thika	Tenancy	Act	in	Kolkata	and	Chawls10	in	Mumbai	that	benefited	thousands	of	poor.	
The	period	between	the	1970s	and	1990	witnessed	state	acting	as	a	developer	to	build	
public	 housing	 alongside	 upgrading	 and	 Sites	 and	 Services	 schemes	 to	 address	 the	
problem	of	slums.	
	
The	1990s	decade	witnessed	emergence	of	decentralisation	and	 liberalisation	as	the	
two	 pillars	 of	 governance	 architecture.	 	 Consistent	 with	 global	 trends	 of	
democratisation,	 the	dramatic	declaration	in	the	9th	Five	Year	Plan	“Housing	is	State	
[Government’s]	 subject”	 was	 abandoned	with	 	 the	 74th	 	 Constitutional	 amendment,	
which	made	 Urban	 Local	 Bodies	 (ULBs)	 responsible	 for	 housing	 and	 services.	 This	
‘decentralisation’	 turn	 marks	 a	 major	 departure	 from	 the	 provider	 regime,	 which	
predominantly	consisted	of	hierarchical	relations.	In	line	with	Bermeo’s	(1990,	p.368)	
																																																								
9 Thika Tenancy Act 1949 provided regularization of bustees or slum settlements with three tier ownership arrangement. 
Under this arrangement, bustee dwellers rent space in huts built by Thika tenants on land leased to them by the 
landowners. The Act confers protection against eviction and that land can be inherited not alienated. The settlements were 
assured of metered electricity connections. Concepts and Thika and Chawls were non-conformist and idiosyncratic 
approaches of tenure regularisation, implemented at a time when, internationally, eviction was widespread. 
10	Chawls are public or private rental housing built in 19th century by government or private landlords to accommodate 
the migrants coming from villages due to the rising employment in cotton industry. Chawls are buildings with one room 
or two room units of not more than 20m2 attached by a common corridor with shared toilets on each floor.	
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three	phases	of	democratisation11,	 Indian	democratisation12	went	 through	a	 gradual	
transfer	 of	 central	 powers	 to	 local and state governments in the 1990s. The devolved	
responsibility	 led	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 housing	 schemes	 for	 the	
impoverished,	which	were	designed	by	the	centre	but	required	matching	funds	from	
state	and	local	governments	and	implemented	by	ULBs.	Urban	Basic	Services	Scheme	
(1986),	later	renamed	as	Urban	Basic	Services	for	Poor	(1991),	Nehru	Rozgar	Yojna’s	
Scheme	of	Housing	and	Shelter	Upgradation	(1990)	and	National	Slum	Development	
Programme	(1996)	were	among	those.	 	Housing	decentralisation	did	not	manifest	in	
the	same	way	as	observed	in	Brazil,	however,	the	centrality	of	the	regional	level	grew	
stronger	 in	 cases	 of	 mega	 cities	 Mumbai,	 Kolkata	 and	 Delhi,	 where	 the	 regional	
governments	 designed	 a	 welfare	 model	 with	 its	 own	 strong	 identity13 .	 Across	 the	
																																																								
11 According to Bormeo (1990, p.368) the breakdown of an authoritarian regime might be regarded as the first (analytical) 
phase of a democratisation process. The second phase then is the construction of a democratic regime, while the final 
phase is the consolidation of democracy. 
 
12	In	India,	democratisation	was	implemented	through	Panchayati	Raj	system	as	the	prime	instrument	of	
decentralization.	The	Indian	states	were	functioning	as	a	federation	only	at	two	levels	‐	Union	and	States.	The	73rd	
amendment	strengthens	the	decentralisation	process	in	India	and	facilitates	powers	from	the	states	to	the	local	
bodies.	
 
13 However it should also be noted that these cities have not always promoted welfare interventions as real priorities for 
the city, despite the considerable budget at disposal. This reflects their attitudes and approach towards city development. 
For instance, Delhi’s approach has been rather heavy-handed toward low-income housing whilst Mumbai has made great 
efforts to address the problems by way of integration of transfer of development rights etc. 
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nation,	 liberalisation	 policy	 was	 introduced	 with	 a	 significant	 fanfare	 that	 led	 to	 a	
paradigmatic	 shift	 in	 housing	 delivery	 process.	 The	 public‐private	 partnership,	
regulatory	 reforms	 coupled	 with	 deregulated	 finance	 sector	 firmly	 established	 the	
government’s	role	as	an	enabler	of	housing,	with	a	 focus	on	all‐income	housing.	The	
National	Housing	policy,	1994	made	explicit	recognition	to	the	economic	contribution	
of	 the	 housing	 and	 construction	 sector	 in	 generating	 employment.	 Around	 25	 new	
housing	 finance	 institutions	(HFIs)	were	set	up	between	1990	and	2000	(Sahu	et	al,	
2009)	to	boost	lending	and	construction	activities	targeted	to	middle	and	high‐income	
households.	 By	 2001,	 100	 per	 cent	 FDI	 was	 allowed	 in	 integrated	 township	
development.	The	neoliberal	adjustments	continued	through	to	slum	programmes	in	
mega	cities	such	as	Mumbai.	For	instance,	the	SRP	(Slum	Rehabilitation	Programme)	
was	implemented	by	the	Slum	Rehabilitation	Authority	(SRA)	first	in	1997,	which	can	
be	described	as	the	precursor	of	the	current	slum	redevelopment	programmes.	Nijman	
(2008)	describes	SRP	as	marking	 	 a	 critical	 shift	 in	 the	 state’s	 role,	 as	a	provider	of	
public	 housing	 to	 that	 of	 a	 facilitator	 	 of	 construction	 of	 low‐income	 housing	 by	
optimising	on	Mumbai’s	complex	zoning	and	density	regimes	to	ensure	development	
rights	 	and	assuring	 	maximum	profits	for	private	builders	at	virtually	no	cost	to	the	
exchequer.	 However,	 the	 slum	 population	 continued	 to	 soar	 putting	 an	 upward	
	 23
pressure	on	urban	housing	shortage.	By	2012	urban	housing	shortage	stood	at	18.78	
million	units	what	was	expected	to	grow	at	a	compound	annual	rate	of	6.6	per	cent	up	
to	the	year	2022.	In	an	apparent	reversal	of	the	role,	central	government	would	revert	
to	direct	provision	of	housing	by	initiating	a	series	of	pro‐poor	housing	programmes	in	
the	next	decade	as	discussed	in	the	following	paragraphs.		
	
One	of	the	early	and	popular	centrally‐sponsored	scheme	aimed	at	benefiting		the	
Slum	Dwellers	was	Valmiki	Ambedkar	Awas	Yojana	(VAMBAY).	The	scheme	was	
primarily	aimed	at	ameliorating	the	housing	problems	for	the	slum	dwellers	living	
Below	Poverty	Line.	It	provided	about	INR	3	billion	(US$0.3	billion)	of	annual	
assistance	to	designated	state	agencies	responsible	for	implementation.	The	central	
government	also	mandated	state	governments	to	use	20	percent	of	the	total	allocation	
under	VAMBAY	for	the	National	Sanitation	Project.	Whilst	heralded	as	a	success	in	its	
initial	years,	there	was	geographic	bias	in	their	performance	largely	due	to	state	
governments	being	reluctant	to	match‐fund.	Buckley,	Singh	and	Kalarickal	(2007)	
illustrate	the	State	indifference	in	the	use	of	VAMBAY	resources	comparing	two	states,	
Kerala,	and	Bihar	in	2001‐02.	The	former	with	45,000	urban	slum	dwellers	received	
US$113	(INR	5,672)	per	capita	and	the	latter,	with	more	than	500,000	urban	slum	
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dwellers	received	nothing.	VAMBAY	was	subsumed	in	a	new	scheme	called	Integrated	
Housing	and	Slum	Development	Programme	(IHSDP).	
	
Perhaps	the	first	post‐neoliberal	and	conceptually	important	intervention	in	housing	
materialised	through	Jawaharlal	Nehru	Urban	Renewal	Mission	(JNNURM),	launched	
in	2005.		As	an	integrated	programme	based	on	three	strands	of	policy	‐	alignment	of	
urban	housing,	infrastructure	and	services,	developing	urban	governance	through	
decentralisation	and	development	of	new	models	of	low‐income	housing	in	65	major	
cities14.	Despite	putting	the	right	foot	forward,	the	JNNURM	buckled	due	to	being	
unabashedly	neoliberal	which	was	delivered	through	the	application	of	twin	
objectives		a)securing	economic	reforms	and	b)‘private‐sector	first’	approach.	The	
former	is	evident	from	the	central	government	making	JNNURM	conditional	on	state	
governments	to	carry	out	economic	reforms	such	as	reduction	of	stamp	duty	rates.	
The	latter	has	been	actively	pursued	by	the	funding	agencies.		For	instance,	the	World	
Bank	which	partly	finances		Urban	Reform	and	Management	Project	in	Karnataka	(as	
																																																								
14 Under the JNNURM, the Central government gives grants covering 50 per cent of the project cost for cities with 
population between one million and four million. For cities with population higher than four million, the Central grant is 
35 per cent of the project cost. The remaining funding comes from the state's kitty and the urban local bodies or parstatals. 
At present, there are 523 projects related to urban infrastructure development that is being implemented in 65 cities across 
the country. 
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part	of	JNNURM)	threatened	to	pull	out	unless	a	number	of	enabling		instruments	
including	amendment	of	legislations	(Baindur	and	Kamath,	2009)	was	introduced.	In	
sum,	the	JNNURM	reflects	a	top‐down	approach		with	limited	participation	from	the	
states	resulting	in	just	22	per	cent	target	achieved.	Going	by	the	performance	of	the	
housing	schemes	for	urban	slum	dwellers	under	Basic	Services	for	the	Urban	Poor	
(BSUP)	scheme	and	Integrated	Housing	and	Slum	Development	Programme	(IHDSP)	
—	the	two	sub‐missions	of	the	JNNURM,	only	0.815	units	out	of	the	total	1.442	million	
sanctioned	units	between	2005	and	2014	(The	Pioneer	2014).	The	extended	period	
for	the	Mission	to	allow	for	ongoing	projects	to	continue	ended	in	March	2017	and	any	
unfinished	projects	morphed	into	respective	states’	programmes.	The	poor	
performance	as	such	defeats	the	objective	of	addressing	housing	needs	of	the	EWS	
and	LIG	population	that	constitutes	over	90%	of	the	population15.		
	
	
	
																																																								
15 Income classification has been the basis for means testing for welfare distribution in India for decades. With improving 
economy, income thresholds are revised. The latest revision shows   annual income of up to INR 100,000 to fall in the 
category of economically weaker section (EWS), according to new criteria formulated by the housing and urban poverty 
alleviation ministry. Households having income between INR 100,000 and INR 200,000 has been classified as low-
income group (LIG). 
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The	government	intervention	in	slum	settlements	continued	with	Rajiv	Awas	Yojana	
(RAY),	launched	in	2013	with	the	ambition	to	create	slum	free	cities.	The	objective	of	
the	programme	has	been	to	bring	existing	slums	into	the	formal	economic	circuit	with	
access	to	basic	amenities	and	to	develop	institutional	and	market	mechanisms	to	tackle	
shortages	 in	 land	 and	 housing	 (Tiwari	 and	 Rao,	 2016).	 Quintessentially	 a	 slum	
rehabilitation	scheme	with	a	neoliberal	twist,	RAY	could	not	take	off	due	to	overlaps		
with	other	 schemes	 and	 lack	 of	willingness	of	 state	 governments	 to	 secure	 land	 for	
relocation	of	slum	dwellers.	In	2015,	RAY	was	replaced	by	Modi	government’s	flagship	
programme,	Pradhanmantri	Awas	Yojana	(PAY),	dubbed	‘Housing	for	All	by	2022’.	This	
mission	aims	to	provide	central	assistance	to	ULBs	and	other	implementing	agencies	
through	 states	 and/or	 Union	 Territories	 for	 in	 situ	 rehabilitation	 of	 existing	 slum	
dwellers	using	land	as	a	resource	through	private	participation,	interest	rate		subsidies	
on	 loans 16 	for	 housing	 EWS	 and	 LIG	 households.	 Under	 this	 programme	 the	
government	 has	 pledged	 to	 construct	 up	 to	 20	 million	 houses	 by	 the	 year	 2022	
(essentially	 aimed	 at	 matching	 the	 18.78	 m	 housing	 deficit)	 and	 according	 to	
preliminary	estimates,	 an	outlay	of	 INR3	 trillion	 (approximately	US$	44	billion)	has	
																																																								
16 Under this programme all eligible households are provided with a central grant between INR100,000- INR230,000 
(US$1483- US$3412) depending on locational factors and the loan with interest subsidy of 6.5 per cent payable in 15 
years. The amount disbursed through the loan is usually matched by the grant amount. 
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been	allocated	to	spread	over	the	next	seven	years.	The	programme	is	being	rolled	out	
in	2508	cities	in	26	states.	It	was	launched	with	self‐aggrandizing	posters	and	adverts	
glorifying	 the	 incumbent	Prime	Minister	Narendra	Modi	 for	 initiating	 a	 panacea	 for	
housing.	 Whilst	 this	 is	 too	 early	 to	 critique	 the	 programme,	 a	 close	 scrutiny	 of	
ingredients	of	PAY	shows	apparent	adhockery	and	inconsistency	and	their	deliveries	
remain	 questionable	 due	 to	 supply‐side	 and	 demand‐side	 challenges.	 Availability	 of	
land	will	be	a	major	challenge	 to	ensure	construction	of	10	million	houses	 in	urban	
areas	for	EWS	which	will	require	57,000	acres	of	urban	land	(roughly	50%	of	total	land	
in	 Mumbai).	 Regulatory	 infrastructural	 reforms	 are	 still	 outstanding.	 Furthermore,	
capacity	of	the	construction	and	building	material	industry	to	construct	3	million	plus	
units	 per	 annum	 is	 seriously	 doubted,	 as	 the	 delivery	 in	 the	 last	 five	 years	 has	 not	
exceeded	one	million.	India	thus	needs	to	up	its		output	by	10	folds	in	the	next	7‐8	years	
to	 achieve	 this	 new	 goal.	 More	 crucially,	 	 the	 programme	 designed	 under	 enabling	
principles	 has	 excessive	 reliance	 on	 its	 partners.	 Banks	 and	 civil	 society	 are	 under‐
prepared	to	disburse	the	volumes	of	loans	planned	for	the	programme.	Demand‐side	
challenges	include		lack	of	affordable	housing	finance	for	EWS	as	the	government	grant	
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of	INR100,000	(US$1490)	per	dwelling,	whilst	being	higher	than	previous	programmes,	
is	a	poor	reflection	of	the	needs	of	the	poor17.		
 
In	sum,	despite	being	replete	with	welfare	rhetoric,	the	centrally‐designed	programmes	
in	 India	have	hung	on	 to	neoliberal	qualities	especially	 in	creating	opportunities	 for	
private	sector,	thus	blurring	the	lines	between	enabling	and	provider	approach.	It	can	
be	argued	 	 that	 these	programmes	have	 introduced	an	 increasingly	commercial	and	
speculative	 element	 into	 urban	management	 and	 aimed	 at	 engineering	 investment‐
oriented	markets	in	land,	services	and	municipal	debt.	Conversely,	urban	policy	in	India	
has	been	steadily	adopting	a	market‐friendly	approach	for	some	time	with	increasing	
level	of	subsidy	to	the	poor.	Under	the	JNNURM	for	instance,	50%	cost	of	construction	
of	home	is	GOI	subsidy,	12%	is	beneficiaries’	contribution	and	remaining	38%	is	the	
state	government	subsidy.	In	this	respect	the	new	programmes	are	more	consolidation	
than	 innovation.	According	 to	 the	12th	 	Five‐year	plan	(2012	–	2017)	urban	housing	
shortage	 in	 the	 country	 stands	 at	 18.78	million	 units	 that	 is	 expected	 to	 grow	 at	 a	
																																																								
17 Affordable housing components with PAY relies on diverse arrangement including developer-led redevelopment of 
slum area, credit‐linked	subsidy	disbursement	to	EWS	and	LIG	with	the	government	sitting	as	a	guarantor,	direct	
subsidy	to	parastatal	agencies	for	schemes	delivering	a	minimum	of	35%	EWS	units	and	loans	for	building	
individual	homes	for	EWS	population.	Ironically, a scheme promoted as being quintessentially affordable could have 
wholly targeted to promote home ownership in EWS category. This refutes the principle of positive intervention, as 
especially, demand coming from EWS far exceeds supply and in this context, government should be seeking to fill the gap 
in housing supply and limit its intervention solely to EWS/LIG category. 
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compound	annual	rate	of	6.6	per	cent	up	to	the	year	2022.	India	is	33	per	cent	urban	
today	although	several	independent	studies	have	projected	different	figures	on	urban	
housing	project.	As	per	the	'White	Paper	‐	Indian	Housing	Industry'18,	urban	housing	
shortage	is	expected	to	reach	34.1	million	units	by	the	year	2022.	The	Industry	experts	
suggest	around	30	million	units	in	all	categories	will	be	needed	to	house	every	Indian,	
which	requires	300	thousand	acres	of	land	and	half	a	trillion	dollar	of	investment	for	
1.5	billion	m2	of	floorspace	to	be	built.	By	this	account,	India	needs	a	multi‐fold	increase	
in	its	housing	supply.		What	is,	however,	missing	from	these	analyses	is	the	dimension	
of	empty	homes	and	ghost	towns	that	are	now	becoming	a	common	sight	in	metro	cities	
in	India.	This	leads	to	a	hypothesis	that	there	might	be	more	house	than	households	in	
certain	areas.	The	2011	Census	which	reported	India’s	household	increase	from	187m	
in	2001	to	247m	between	in	2011,	against	the	increase	in	new	homes	in	the	market	
from	250m	to	331m	during	the	same	period.	This	suggests	38m	new	units	created	for	
24m	new	households.	Despite	this	increase	in	the	number	of	houses,	housing	problem	
is	not	solved	as	the	majority	housing	shortage	in	comes	from	bottom	segments	of	the	
population.	 India	may	soon	be	 forced	 to	 follow	Brazil’s	 lead	on	 empty	properties	 in	
urban	areas.		
																																																								
18 This is based on the recent report by research and consultancy firm RNCOS. 
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Figure	2:	Different	faces	of	Slums	and	squatter	settlements	in	Indian	cities	
Source:	Authors	
	
4	 International	Housing	Policy	and	some	policy	contradictions	
One	 of	 the	 early	 and	 probably	 most	 common	 views	 on	 enabling	 approach	 (as	 an	
offshoot	 of	 neoliberalism)	 within	 housing	 studies	 depicts	 neoliberalism	 to	 be	
unfavourable	to	urban	poor.		Neoliberalism	is	studied	and	described	for	its	supposed	
effects	 on	 the	 poor,	 characterised	 by	 privatisation,	 deregulation	 and	 diminishing	
welfare	benefits	and	accelerating	poverty,	increasing	the	number	of	households	living	
in	slums	and	favelas	around	the	world.		Clearly,	a	dominant	trend	emerging	from	the	
discussions	 of	 various	 	 programmes	 in	 Brazil	 and	 India	 shows	 a	 response	 to	 such	
conditions	by	the	re‐engagement	of	the	respective	governments	in	low‐income	housing	
delivery.	As	discussed	in	the	preceding	section,	the	direct	supply	of		housing	by	the	state	
proved	wrong	time	and	again	but	the	practice	still	continues	in	both	countries.	Albeit,	
we	don’t	call	them	‘public	housing’	anymore.	They	are	subsidy‐led	housing	solutions	
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intended	for	 the	urban	poor.	Notwithstanding	discursive	variations	exist	 in	terms	of	
what	Gilbert	(2004)	calls	‘depth	vs.	breadth’	of	subsidy	dispensing,19	across	Brazil	and	
India,	there	is	a	consistent	trend	of	reversal	of	subsidy	withdrawal	that	marks	a	broader	
shift	 from	 the	 enabler	 regime	 to	 a	 provider	 one	 (Table	 2).	 For	 example,	 the	MCMV	
programme	 in	 Brazil	 has	 set	 a	 high	 subsidy	 incidence	 (between	 60%	 and	 90%	 of	
property	value).	Projects	are	approved	by	the	appropriate	bodies	and	sold	to	Brazilian	
Federal	Saving	Bank.	India	is	also	steadily	raising	the	subsidy	quotient	with	successive	
programmes.	The	recently	launched	PAY	impinges	on	higher	subsidy	for	success	and	to	
some	extent,	modelled	on	a	public	housing	schemes,	which	we		argue	represent	a	new	
generation	of	 ‘public	housing’	for	the	low‐income	people.	However,	we	would	like	to	
caution	 that	 these	programmes	 should	be	 viewed	as	 an	open‐ended,	 trial	 and	 error	
process	 of	 policy	 movement,	 which	 is	 still	 evolving	 subject	 to	 the	 shrouds	 of	
misconceptions	set	out	below.	
Table	2	Housing	programmes,	subsidies	and	outlay	
 
Sources:	Brazil:	United	Nations	Human	Settlements	Programme	(http://www.myhousemylifebrazil.	
																																																								
19 For instance, projects in India combine cash and credit subsidy that shows greater breadth than Brazil’s deeper cash 
subsidy. 
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com/;	 http://www.caixa.gov.br);	 India:	 Ministry	 of	 Housing	 and	 Urban	 Poverty	 Alleviation	
(http://mhupa.gov.in/)	
	
MISCONCEPTION	#1:	Impoverished	people	need	complete	homes	
The	contemporary	housing	programmes	in	both	Brazil	and	India	have	a	huge	emphasis	
on	home	ownership.	The	idea	sees	‘ownership’	enabling	households	to	access	formal	
credit,	 in	 turn,	 bringing	 low‐income	 homes	 within	 the	 wider	 financial	 circuits.		
However,	 they	 rarely	 appear	 in	 such	 pure	 forms.	 Instead,	 they	 pose	 an	 interesting	
conundrum	–	whilst	property	ownership	is	a	stimulant	to	investment,	a	finished	and	
complete	home	is	often	difficult	to	consume	by	the	urban	poor	with	no	jobs,	income	or	
assets.	In	other	words,	housing	as	a	commodity	becomes	too	expensive	for	the	urban	
poor	owing	to	the	imputed	costs	of	the	ownership	(Wakely,	2014).	The	claim	that	poor	
households	as	a	category	are	consumers	and	need	complete	or	finished	homes	is	an	
implicit	reproduction	of	the	middle‐class	paradigm	fueled	by	the	notion	that	in	an	over‐
heated	property	market,	homeowners	tend	to	gain	the	most	(Sengupta,	2014;	Smets,	
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1995).	 	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 low‐income	 households 20 	are	 actually	 looking	 for	 an	
enclosure	 that	 gives	 them	sense	of	 	 a	 security	 and	permanence	 to	 live	 as	well	 as	 to	
engage	 in	employment	opportunities.	 Ironically,	 the	concept	of	 finished	home	is	still	
embedded	 in	 these	 modernising	 projects	 often	 achieved	 through	 relocation	 posing	
problems	 to	 both	 beneficiaries	 as	 well	 as	 the	 project.	 The	 impact	 on	 the	 former	 is	
related	to	loss	of	social	network	that	plays	a	significant	role	in	accessing	job	or	informal	
credit,	 whilst	 the	 ownership‐led	 programmes	 do	 not	 nurture	 this.	 Instead,	
homeownership	 actually	 increases	 their	 cost	 of	 living,	 and	 quite	 often,	 turns	 out	
unaffordable	due	to	associated	costs	such	as	property	tax,	registration	fee,	capital	gains	
etc.	 	 In	a	study	of	Affordable	Housing	Partnership	scheme	 in	Gujrat,	Barnhardt	et	 al	
(2015)	 found	 	 the	 loss	of	social	capital	 to	be	a	major	driver	 for	more	than	one‐third	
households	 to	 abandon	 the	 newly	 acquired	 homes	 and	 to	 return	 to	 their	 original	
location.	These	projects	also	face	 	additional	financial	burden	associated	with	higher	
subsidies	 as	 project	 costs	 go	 up	 to	 deliver	 these	 ‘complete	 homes’.	 In	 India,	 RAY	
experienced	delays	in	finding	new	land	leading	to	cost	escalations,	which,	in	turn,	meant	
																																																								
20 Our informal interviews with households living in Favelas and slums confirm this view. Both researchers 
from Sao Paulo and India team have conducted interviews in their cities/sites.   
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housing	was	not	delivered	on	the	required	scale	and	became	unaffordable	to	the	target	
beneficiaries.	 Conversely,	 shoots	 of	 innovations	 have	been	witnessed	 in	Brazil,	with	
“tenant‐based”	housing	subsidies	for	reusing	such	vacant	properties,	as	especially,	with	
the	 landmark	 decision	 to	 fund	 the	 Epiranga	 project	 with	 MCMV,	 the	 concept	 of	
‘incremental	 housing’	 has	 been	 brought	 to	 the	 mainstream.	 Incremental	 housing,	 ,	
considered	a	viable	splinter	of	housing	supply	received	much	attention	internationally	
with	 Architect	 Alejandro	 Aravena’s	 popular	 concept	 of	 building	 only	 the	 physical	
foundations,	 walls,	 stairs,	 kitchen	 and	 bathrooms	 of	 the	 homes.	 In	 India,	 slum	 and	
squatter	population	have	been	known	to	take	this	approach.	De	Soto’s	(2000)	thesis	
that	 homeownership	 will	 eradicate	 urban	 poverty	 in	 global	 south	 brought	 	 some	
enthusiasm	to	what	the	World	Bank	and	UN‐Habitat	had	been	preaching	for	decades	
(through	their	land	titling	and	ownership	programmes	in	the	global	South)	but	these	
ownership	projects	rarely	met	their	full	objectives	
	
MISCONCEPTION	#2:	Government	promoting	housing	policy	(not	economic	policy)	
Housing	programmes	in	both	countries	continue	to	be	economic‐driven.	Enabling	
housing	framework	is	rooted	to	economic	rationality	‐	the	dominant	form	of	
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rationality	‐	which	invaded	the	world	during	the	neoliberal	structuring	of	the	1980s.		
Following	the	debt	crisis,		governments	in	the	developing	countries	were	
subsequently	transformed	as	the	agents	of	the	global	capital	market	and	were	
mobilised	to	institutionalise	the	private	housing	market.	Government	intervention	in	
both	Brazil	and	India	can	be	accused	of	aiming	to	hit	too	many	targets.	Larger	housing	
deﬁcit	coupled	with	economic	debts	force	governments	to	explore	multiple	gains	from	
these	state‐initiated	housing	projects.		No	housing	policy,	especially	since	the	advent	
of	neoliberalism,	has	been	developed	as	a	‘housing	policy’	of	its	own.	They	are	rather	
molded	within	a	broader	economic	framework	of	the	government	‘to	partner	with	and	
respond	to,	the	needs	of	the	market,	infrastructure	development,	and	even	welfare	are	
corollaries	of	this’(Sud,	2017).	This	notion	is	embedded	in	the	approach	that	sees	
subsidies	directed	to	ﬁnancing	new,	complete	homes	as	economic	‘assets’	or	
‘products’	that	can	activate	the	construction	and	finance	sector.	Housing	is	both	means	
and	the	end	product	rolled	into	one,	which	makes	it	a	perfect	tool	to	achieve	multiple	
advantages.	Low‐income	homes	are	delivered	by	the	state	as	commodified	assets	so	
that	it	can	help	to	maintain	broader	market	and	social	equilibrium	serving	two	goals:	
to	encourage	market	ownership	of	low‐income	housing	in	the	long	run	and	to	resist	
perpetuating	of	welfare	function	of	housing	as	a	social	good.	On	this	basis,	it	can	be	
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argued	that	through	ownership	drive	the	state	seeking	to	pursue	economic	policy	
rather	than	housing	policy.	In	Brazil,	the	MCMV	Programme	was	launched	amidst	an	
economic	crisis	aimed	at	tackling	two	distinct	issues:	lower	the	housing	deficit	and	to	
boost	the	construction	industry.	The	programme	undoubtedly	warmed	up	the	
Brazilian	construction	market		by	encouraging	competition	for	land	and		skilled	
construction	workers.	However,	the	booming	construction	market	soon	created	a	
labour	shortage	and	hiked	the	construction	costs,	eventually	requiring	greater	
subsidies	from	the	federal	government.	In	India,	the	real	estate	sector	is	a	major	
component	of	the	Indian	economy	which	contributed	to	6.3%	of	the	GDP	in	2013/14,	
at	an	estimated	INR3.7	trillion	(US$55	billion)	(CREDAI,	2013).	In	both	Brazil	and	
India,	we	have	observed	a	strong	inclination	towards	low‐income	public	housing	to	
form		a	housing	safety	net	during	this	economic	transition.		This,	we	argue	with	time,	
will	gain	permanence.	But	this	requires	a	general	understanding	and	reconfiguration	
of	economic	and	social	policies		that	could	integrate	with	the	national	housing	system	
more	effectively.		
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MISCONCEPTION	 #3:	 Government	 has	 created	 conditions	 for	 effective	 private	 sector	
operation	
	
The	 idea	 of	 efficient	 privatised	 urban	 government	 delivering	 low‐income	 housing	
implies	housing	poverty	is	internalised	into	the	market	mechanism.	Enabling	private	
sector	to	provide	for	the	poor	continues	its	primacy	in	the	plans	and	programmes	in	
both	countries.	What	is,	however,	problematic	is	the	zealous	pursuit	without	creating	
conditions	for	it.	The	drive	towards	home	ownership,	complete	homes,	and	economic	
goals	 together,	 hint	 at	 greater	 financial	 outlay	 to	 deliver	 new	 homes	 and	 as	 a	
consequence,	a	need	to	rely	on	the	private	capital.	However	barring	few	projects	that	
were	 designed	 under	 PPP	 principle,	 conditions	 to	 attract	 private	 capital	 are	 still	
outstanding.	 For	 instance,	 in	 India,	 this	 relates	 to	 slow	 and	 uneven	 progress	 in	 the	
several	aspects	of	regulatory	reforms.		The	slow	progress	in	reforming	the	Rent	Control	
Act	 has	 persisted	 despite	 explicit	 recognition	 from	 influential	 programmes	 such	 as	
JNNURM	identifying	it	as	a	bottleneck	for	reform	and	recommending	four‐point	plan	to	
address	it.	Likewise,	the	much‐maligned	ULCRA	has	been	repealed,	but	as	Ahluwalia	et	
al	(2013)	claim,	reform	has	been	deceptive	as	all	cases	that	are	in	the	court	continued	
to	 be	 governed	 by	 the	 earlier	 Act.	 	 	 Amendments	 of	 city	 Master	 Plans	 to	 include	
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unauthorised	settlements	has	been	even	slower	as	Bhan	(2009)	argues	progressive	city	
governments	 such	 as	Delhi	 have	 continued	 to	 ignore	 the	 alleged	 ‘blackspots’	 in	 the	
periphery	causing	uncertainty	over	land	availability	in	the	city	fringes.	Likewise,	reform	
on	 the	permit	 system	continues	 to	be	slow	and	uneven	 (Sengupta,	2013).	 	Ram	and	
Needham	(2016)	argue	even	with	the	existing	rules	developers	could	build	affordable	
homes	for	EWS/LIG,	but	they	are	not	doing	so	due	to	the	complexity	and	rigidity	of	the	
existing	registration	and	permit	system.	Owing	to	the	high	transaction	cost	and	rising	
labour	costs	coupled	with		the	current	capacity	of	the	construction	industry,	housing	
delivery	 to	 the	scale	set	by	 these	programmes	within	a	short	 timeframe	 is	seriously	
questionable.	The	capacity	of	the	implementation	authorities	is	similarly	ignored.	For	
the	ULBs,	several	challenges	were	identified	in	reform	implementation.	These	include	
the	complexities	relating	to	certain	policy	reforms	(e.g.	property	tax	and	user	charges	
for	basic	services),	the	challenge	of	implementing	both	reforms	together	with	projects,	
weak	capacity	of	ULBs,	and	the	lack	of	funding	for	reforms.	Under	JNNURM	for	instance,		
the	 ULBs	 were	 dependent	 on	 the	 state’s	 reforms	 in	 order	 to	 release	 agreed	 funds	
resulting	 in	 delays	 in	 project	 implementation	 (Sharma,	 2013).	 The	 ‘one‐size‐fits‐all’	
approach	of	demanding	that	all	states	and	ULBs	achieve	23	reforms	within	seven	years	
regardless	 of	 their	 stage	 of	 development,	 capacity	 and	 financial	 status,	 was	
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overambitious	(Thornton,	2011).	While	India	remains	a	prime	example	of	regulatory	
barriers	asphyxiating	private	sector	involvement,	Brazil	provides	insights	into	pitfalls	
of	rapid	deregulation	and	inability	to	manage	the	change.	The	lack	of	regulation	in	the	
real‐estate	 market	 has	 unleashed	 speculation,	 increasing	 property	 values	 in	 city	
centres,	which	has	pushed	social	housing	projects	(such	as	MCMV)	to	the	outskirts	of	
cities.	In	addition,	very	few	developers	are	able	to	compete	in	the	system	as	the	scale	of	
the	projects	demand	a	high	amount	of	initial	capital—inevitably	creating	a	monopoly.	
To	create	a	private	sector‐enabling	environment	that	is	conducive	to	increasing	social	
housing	supply	is	thus	a	far	more	complex	undertaking	than	just	providing	the	basic	
market	institutions.	
	
	
MISCONCEPTION	#4:	Sufficient	participation	and	enablement	at	local	level	
	
As	 explained	 in	 the	 earlier	 narratives,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 decentralisation	 is	 central	 to	
providing	 a	 new	 context	 within	 which	 low‐income	 housing	 in	 Brazil	 and	 India	 is	
emerging.	More	precisely,	decentralisation	is	taking	place	in	the	context	of	neoliberal	
national	 macroeconomic	 environment.	 Whilst	 the	 concept	 is	 unproblematic	 as	
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decentralised systems of housing delivery involving market actors, government agencies and 
NGOs is set against the general context of neoliberalism, without	adequate	empowerment	
of	 local	 actors,	 the	 process	 breeds	 ambivalence	 and	 inconsistency.	 For	 instance,	 the	
flagship	programmes	both	in	India	and	Brazil	have	ignored	their	inherent	weakness,	
which	relates	to	lack	of	understanding	of	the	capacity	at	the	local	level.	Higher	goals	set	
by	 these	 programmes	 (such	 as	 legislative	 reforms)	 are	 beyond	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	
implementing	bodies	There	appears	to	be	a	distinct	disillusionment	with	the	concept	of	
decentralisation	and	its	ability	to	run	in	tandem	with	the	government	conceptualisation	
of	housing	delivery	at	the	local	level.	In	India,	Tiwari	and	Rao	(2016)	contend	that	while	
most	of	these	programmes	are	well	intended	in	terms	of	their	housing	decentralisation	
objectives,	they	could	not	deliver	much	due	to	lack	of	financial	resources	at	local	level,	
excessive	dependency	on	the	central	government	for	funds	leading	to	sustenance	of	the	
top–down	 approach,	 with	 poor	 participation	 from	 the	 state	 governments,	marginal	
inputs	 from	the	operational	agencies	and	 lacked	public	participation.	Livengood	and	
Kunte	 (2014)	 claim	 NGO	 and	 CBO	 participation	 in	 BSUP	 projects,	 like	 those	 under	
VAMBAY,	 had	 no	 place	 in	 the	 decision‐making	 process.	 The	 eligibility	 lists,	 house	
designs,	specifications	and	terms	and	conditions	are	developed	before	NGOs	and	slum	
dwellers	 are	 invited	 to	 participate	 and	 bid	 on	 projects.	 Public	 and	 civic	 body	
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participation	in	decision	making		of	individual	city	development	plans	has	remained	a	
far	cry	despite	the	government	rhetoric	to	encourage	participation	in	the	planning	and	
decision‐making	phase.On	the	other	hand	lack	of	progress	in	capacity	building	among	
both	ULBs	and	local	governments	to	prepare	and	implement	projects	is	striking.	Most	
of	 the	smaller	ULBs	do	not	have	 the	capacity	 to	prepare	City	Development	Plan,	but	
endorsed	it	notionally	so	that	projects	could	be	submitted	to	the	Centre	and	funds	could	
flow	to	the	city	(Sivaramakrishnan,	2011).	The	complex	requirements	set	by	RAY	for	
technology‐laden	data	 collection	and	 analysis	 before	 local	 plans	 and	 funding	 can	be	
approved	has	been	an	exclusionary	practice	(Livengood	and	Kunte,	2014).	This	mirrors	
the	 technical	 requirements	 forced	 by	 JNNURM	 resulting	 in	 exclusion	 of	most	 of	 the	
economically	less	advanced	states.	On	the	other	hand,	very	little	of	the	funds	set	aside	
for	 capacity	 building	 has	 been	 effectively	 used.	 In	 India	 individual	 states	 feel	
marginalised	 and	 lose	 appetite	 to	 drive	 ambitious	 programmes.	 Without	 active	
participation,	 the	 city	 Master	 Plans	 developed	 by	 participating	 state	 governments	
remain	 divorced	 from	 the	 urban	 planning	 process	 and	 lack	 connectivity.	 The	
decentralisation	 of	 housing	 delivery	 in	 Brazil	 is	 relativelymore	 advanced	 with	
incentives	for	setting‐up	state	and	municipal	funds	and	councils,	aimed	at	producing	
housing	 through	 a	 decentralised	 system.	 However,	 a	 high	 number	 of	 different	
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programmes,	funds,	and	delivery	mechanisms	made	the	housing	system	more	complex	
and	in	turn	less	effective.		
	
6.	Conclusion	
In	the	previous	sections,	housing	approaches	in	Brazil	and	India	are	discussed	which	
emphasise	global	trends	and	resistance	to	wholesome	acceptance	of	enabling	housing	
framework.	 Both	 countries	 have	 initiated	 state	 administered	 large‐scale	 housing	
programmes	 within	 diverse	 institutional	 contexts	 quite	 in	 line	 with	 the	 emerging	
international	trend	in	low‐income	housing	delivery	(Buckley	et	al,	2006).	The	processes	
perhaps	 include	 more	 issues	 and	 practices	 than	 we	 can	 cover	 here.	 The	 paper,	
therefore,	draws	attention	to	major	observations.	First,	the	continuous	production	of	
public	housing	 in	various	 forms	to	support	 the	 low‐income	households;	and	second,	
governments	both	in	Brazil	and	India	are	adhering	to	enabling	housing	framework	and		
the	state	is	taking	onto	itself,	the	responsibility	to	provide	for	the	poor.	Thus,	as	one	
policy	 approach	 follows	 another	 the	 discursive	 space	 for	 the	 government	 policy	
doctrine	acquires	a	 layered	structure,	which	contains	elements	of	both	provider	and	
enabling	approaches.	Whilst	these	developments	are	still	evolutionary	they	constitute	
an	important	basis	for	the	eventual	transition	from	enabler	back	to	provider	approach.	
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As	 a	minimum,	 this	 finding	 changes	 the	 presumption	 that	 a	 correct	 housing	 policy	
stance	for	urban	poor	in	global	South	should	be	one	of	benign	handover	(to	the	market	
or	private	sector).		Arguably	on	this	basis,	considerably	more,	not	less,	attention	should	
be	given	to	providing	housing	to	the	poor	in	these	countries	and	structuring	innovative	
subsidy	programmes	to	do	so.	This	trend	is	not	common	in	Western	countries.	In	the	
UK	many	local	authorities	have	become	house‐builders	again	after	borrowing	cap	was	
relaxed	 in	 recent	 years	 favouring	 bricks	 and	 mortar	 investment	 over	 individual	
subsidies.	In	a	poignant	advice	to	governments	around	the	world,	UN‐Habitat	(2016)	
imparts	 a	 clear	 message	 to	 avoid	 privatization	 of	 public	 rental	 housing	 where	 it	
converts	 it	 to	 private	 rental.	 The	 ‘housing	 right’	 approach	 (‘Back	 to	 the	 city’	
programmes	in	Brazil)	also	represents	an	important	departure	from	the	previous	top‐
down	approach	of	the	federal	government.	
However,	a	complete	reversion	of	the	policy	trend	in	both	countries	will	still	be	some	
distance	away	at	least	for	two	reasons.	First,	because	the	production	of	a	broader	set	
of	policies	for	housing	has	not	been	a	production	of	one	specific	governance	decision.	
Second,	because	programmes	such	as	the	MCMV	and	the	JNNURM	mobilised	powerful	
private	interests	and	broad	coalitions	that	will	create	resistance	to	any	policy	
reversals.	Nevertheless,	the	pursuit	of	policy	changes	confronts	many	challenges	
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within	the	complex	dynamics	of	both	supply	and	demand	side	environments	that	did	
not	exist	in	provider	era	of	the	1980s.	There	are	now	twice	as	many	democratic	
governments	in	the	world	as	two	decades	ago,	and	they	are	overwhelmingly	more	
decentralised.	Over	time,	the	low‐income	housing	market	has	seen	a	phenomenal	
growth	and,	is	no	longer	a	marginal	investment,	and	is	an	economy	of	scale	now	that	is	
capable	of	giving	profitable	returns.		The	former	requires	the	plans	and	programmes	
to	be	inclusive,	process‐driven	and	responsive	to	the	diverse	local	needs	for	which	the	
government’s	role	remains	critical.	The	latter	requires	the	government		to	organise	
the	supply	chain	around	delivering	low‐income	housing,	enabling	procurement	of		
building	material	at	scale	to	facilitate	construction	industry,	design	right	delivery	
model	to	encourages	private	sector	participation	at	scale.	Designing	acceptable	credit	
risk	for	housing	financing	and	devising	integrated	programmes	that	bring	everything	
together	will	be	the	lynchpin	to	the	success.	 
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